@sitespeed.io/chromedriver
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Chromedriver releases track Chrome versions; publish gaps are normal for this package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): Standard chromedriver binary download via node install.js; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used to launch chromedriver binary; expected for a browser driver wrapper package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 148.0.7778 | 1 / 7 | |
| 147.0.7727 | 2 / 6 | |
| 144.0.7559 | 2 / 6 | |
| 143.0.7499 | 2 / 6 |
v148.0.7778
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v147.0.7727
2 findingsScript: node install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v144.0.7559
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v143.0.7499
2 findingsScript: node install.js
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.