@sk-web-gui/cookie-consent
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sk-web-gui/forms | AI (dependencies): Same @sk-web-gui monorepo family; consistent pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo component; missing metadata is a pattern across the @sk-web-gui namespace, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent with @sk-web-gui monorepo package style; not a malice signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.18 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.17 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.16 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.15 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.14 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.14 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.13 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.11 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 1 |
v2.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2025-04-09, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2025-03-31, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.14
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2025-01-02, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2024-08-22, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-08-06, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2024-06-18, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-05-27, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.