@sk-web-gui/menu-vertical
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped UI component package in an established org; missing metadata is a style issue, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established package family; missing description is cosmetic. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.10 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.2.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.1.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.1.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.1.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.1.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.0.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 1 |
v2.2.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2025-04-28, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2025-04-09, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2025-03-31, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2025-01-02, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-09-05, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devizetim) than the most recent previously approved version (jerkerosatiesk) on 2024-08-22, but devizetim is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-08-06, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-06-13, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jerkerosatiesk) than the most recent previously approved version (devizetim) on 2024-05-27, but jerkerosatiesk is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.