@sk-web-gui/progress-stepper
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sk-web-gui/theme | AI (phantom-deps): Scoped sibling dependency; likely used transitively through other @sk-web-gui imports. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo component with minimal metadata; no repo/homepage is typical for internal packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.3.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.2.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.2.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.2.5 | 5 / 1 |
v1.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.