@skiley/runfile-win32-arm64
runfile binary for win32-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package's sole purpose is distributing the runfile win32-arm64 binary; bundled .exe is expected and covered by SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 |
v0.11.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • run.exe
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.