@slickgrid-universal/pdf-export
PDF Export Service for SlickGrid Universal.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from ghiscoding to GitHub Actions is the documented CI/CD automation pattern for this monorepo; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): jspdf and sibling @slickgrid-universal/* deps are expected for a PDF export service in this monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@slickgrid-universal/utils | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same slickgrid-universal monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline gap, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@slickgrid-universal/common | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same slickgrid-universal monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline gap, not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.7.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.7.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.6.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.5.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.5.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.5.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.4.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.0.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.13.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v10.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.13.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.