@smithy/eventstream-serde-browser
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@smithy/eventstream-serde-browser) [](https://ww
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from smithy-team to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected for this AWS org. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable across versions; AWS Smithy sub-package convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper declared in dependencies; its use as an implicit dependency is a well-known pattern across all @smithy packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): smithy-team consistently publishes without Sigstore provenance across all 46 packages; this is a stable characteristic of the publisher, not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.2.14 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.13 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.10 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.9 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 4 |
v4.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.