@smithy/typecheck
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Smithy team transitioned to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; machine publisher is expected for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual maintainer consistent with org-level shift to automated publishing pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit TypeScript runtime dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 49 of 49)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.14 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.13 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.12 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.11 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.10 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.9 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.25 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.24 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.23 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.22 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.21 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.20 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.19 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.18 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.17 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.16 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.15 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.14 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.13 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.12 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.11 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.10 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.9 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.8 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.7 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.6 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 3 |
v1.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.