@snack-uikit/divider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and not a risk indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.6 | 2 / 0 |
v3.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.