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@solana-mobile/mobile-wallet-adapter-protocol-kit

8
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

michaelsulistiofunkatronics_solstevenlaverankur2136olivier.goutay

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Established Solana Mobile org package; sparse README/keywords are typical for SDK sub-packages. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with official solana-mobile org CI/CD adoption. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal aligns with shift to GitHub Actions CI publishing; no takeover indicators. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:bs58 AI (phantom-deps): bs58 is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. ai

Versions (showing 8 of 8)

Version Deps Published
0.3.2 3 / 4
0.3.1 5 / 4
0.3.0 5 / 4
0.2.3 5 / 4
0.2.2 4 / 4
0.2.1 4 / 4
0.2.0 4 / 4
0.1.0 4 / 4

v0.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: funkatronics_sol → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.