@solana/connector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/standard-shim-CGB88PPO.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Minified type declaration file from tsup build, readable TS types, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/standard-shim-tmnQelaJ.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Minified type declaration file from tsup build, readable TS types, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/standard-shim-n5phZB1d.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long-line .d.mts type declarations from tsup bundling, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/standard-shim-BB0Lkg_C.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long-line .d.ts type declarations from tsup bundling, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual→CI/CD-attested transition; improved provenance, not compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Added deps are official @solana/* packages matching package purpose. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@nanostores/persistent | AI (phantom-deps): Used via config/persistence pattern, common false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@wallet-standard/features | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only/feature-detection usage, common false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.6 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.2.4 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.2.3 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.2.2 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.2.1 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.2.0 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.10 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.9 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.8 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.7 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.6 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.5 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.4 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.3 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.2 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.1 | 14 / 12 | |
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.