@solana/keychain-privy
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/__tests__/privy-signer.test.js | AI (source-diff): Long base64 string is a mock Solana wire transaction used in test fixtures, not a payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:src/__tests__/privy-signer.test.ts | AI (source-diff): Same mock base64 wire transaction in test source; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@solana/codecs-core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Solana dep; likely used transitively or in type-level code not caught by import analysis. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Solana SDK uses 0.0.0 as a placeholder version in monorepo stubs; not indicative of malice here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Stub/placeholder package in the @solana scope from a trusted publisher; sparse metadata is expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.5.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.2.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.