@solgrid/napi-darwin-arm64
solgrid NAPI native binding for macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is explicitly a native binding distribution; .node binary is its sole deliverable, attested via SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.