@solgrid/napi-win32-x64
solgrid NAPI native binding for Windows x64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific NAPI binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • solgrid_napi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.