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Web dashboard for some-useful-agents

26
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

gregmeyer

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/allowed-sub-agents-picklist.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): Long lines are inlined client-side JS string constants in .d.ts files, not obfuscation; pattern is stable for this package. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/csp-img-report.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): Same pattern: inlined JS as a TypeScript string constant; readable, commented code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/pulse-configure.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration exporting inline browser JS as string constant; fully readable DOM code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/build-from-goal.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration exporting inline browser JS as string constant; fully readable DOM code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/pulse-refresh.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration exporting inline browser JS as string constant; fully readable DOM code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/suggest-improvements.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration exporting inline browser JS as string constant; fully readable DOM code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/template-palette.js.d.ts AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration exporting inline browser JS as string constant; fully readable DOM code, not obfuscated. ai
source-diff obfuscated-file:dist/views/css.d.ts AI (source-diff): File is a TypeScript declaration exporting an inlined CSS string constant. Long line length triggered the rule, but content is fully readable, benign dashboard styling. Not actual obfuscation. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@some-useful-agents/core AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package declared as dependency; phantom detection reflects indirect usage in compiled TypeScript output, not a real risk. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:express AI (phantom-deps): express is a declared runtime dependency; phantom detection reflects indirect/compiled usage in a TypeScript package, not a real risk. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher changed from gregmeyer to GitHub Actions coincides with adoption of SLSA provenance/Sigstore attestation — a legitimate CI/CD migration, not a takeover signal. ai

Versions (showing 26 of 26)

Version Deps Published
0.24.0 4 / 4
0.22.0 3 / 4
0.21.0 3 / 4
0.20.0 3 / 4
0.19.0 3 / 4
0.18.0 3 / 4
0.17.0 3 / 4
0.16.1 3 / 4
0.16.0 3 / 4
0.15.0 3 / 4
0.14.0 3 / 4
0.12.0 2 / 4
0.11.0 2 / 2
0.10.0 2 / 2
0.9.0 2 / 2
0.8.0 2 / 2
0.7.0 2 / 2
0.6.1 2 / 2
0.6.0 2 / 2
0.5.0 2 / 2
0.4.0 2 / 2
0.3.2 2 / 2
0.3.1 2 / 2
0.3.0 2 / 2
0.2.0 2 / 2
0.1.0 2 / 2

v0.24.0

3 findings
HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/views/allowed-sub-agents-picklist.js.d.ts source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/views/csp-img-report.js.d.ts source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.22.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.21.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.20.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.19.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.18.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.17.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.16.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.16.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.15.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.14.0

3 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/views/css.d.ts source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.12.0

3 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

HIGH New obfuscated file: dist/views/css.d.ts source-diff

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.11.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.10.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: gregmeyer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.