@sp-api-sdk/solicitations-api-v1
With the Solicitations API you can build applications that send non-critical solicitations to buyers. You can get a list of solicitation types that are available for an order that you specify, then call an operation that sends a solicitation to the buyer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (tusbar) to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; consistent with monorepo automation migration. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects CI pipeline migration, not account takeover; SLSA attestation and repo continuity confirm legitimacy. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.20 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.19 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.18 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.17 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.16 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 0 |
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.