@sp1in/claude-agent
Claude Code bridge — chat with Claude from WeChat
1
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
No source commit
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
sp1in
Keywords
pi-packageclaudewechatbridge
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Spreading process.env into child_process spawn options is normal and expected for a subprocess-launching agent bridge. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 3 |
v0.1.0
2 findings
HIGH
env-spread: src/index.ts:82
semgrep
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 80 | cwd: cfg.cwd, 81 | stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], > 82 | env: { ...process.env }, 83 | timeout: cfg.timeoutMs, 84 | shell: useShell,
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.