@spark-web/tabs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spark-web/box | AI (phantom-deps): Sibling monorepo package; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable within same org scope. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established org package; lack of provenance is consistent across all @spark-web/* releases. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spark-web/a11y | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely re-exported or used transitively within the monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.1 | 12 / 1 | |
| 5.2.0 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.1.0 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.0.3 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.0.2 | 13 / 1 |
v5.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.