@spectrum-css/dropzone
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): patrickfulton is an established Adobe org publisher with strong track record; transition within adobe/spectrum-css monorepo. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer rotation within Adobe org; no malicious indicators present. | ai |
v8.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.