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@spectrum-web-components/close-button

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Web component implementation of a Spectrum design CloseButton

11
Versions
Apache-2.0
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

caseyisonittaratadoberajrock38jnjoshnikkimkrubencjianliao79pvashishpatrickfulton

Keywords

design-systemspectrumadobeadobe-spectrumweb componentsweb-componentslit-elementlit-htmlcomponentcss

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): taratadobe is an established Adobe publisher with 684 approved packages; transition from rubenc appears to be a legitimate org handoff. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Adobe OSS monorepo; provenance absence is consistent across all versions of this package family. ai

Versions (showing 11 of 11)

Version Deps Published
1.12.1 1 / 0
1.12.0 1 / 0
1.11.2 1 / 0
1.11.1 1 / 0
1.11.0 1 / 0
1.10.0 1 / 0
1.9.1 1 / 0
1.9.0 1 / 0
1.8.0 1 / 0
1.7.0 1 / 0
1.6.0 1 / 1

v1.12.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: rubenc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.12.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: rubenc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.11.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.11.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.11.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.10.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.9.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.9.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: rubenc → taratadobe (on 2025-10-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.