@spectrum-web-components/progress-circle
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual-to-CI/CD provenance improvement for well-known Adobe monorepo package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Added dep is first-party sibling package pinned to same version, not external. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spectrum-web-components/shared | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo peer/transitive usage patterns. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Adobe OSS monorepo; absence of Sigstore provenance is consistent across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.12.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.12.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.12.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.11.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.11.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.11.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.10.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.9.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.9.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.6.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v1.12.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.9.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (taratadobe) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2025-10-13, but taratadobe is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rajrock38) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2025-01-29, but rajrock38 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rubenc) than the most recent previously approved version (pvashish) on 2024-12-10, but rubenc is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (pvashish) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2024-11-26, but pvashish is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rajrock38) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2024-11-11, but rajrock38 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.