@spinajs/configuration-common
> TODO: description
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 5 of 111)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.367 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.363 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.362 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.361 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.360 | 1 / 0 |
v2.0.367
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.363
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.362
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.361
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.360
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.