@spinajs/intl
internationalization for spinajs framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spinajs/log | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spinajs/configuration | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 110)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.363 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.362 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.361 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.360 | 8 / 0 |
v2.0.363
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.362
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.361
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.360
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.