@sproutsocial/seeds-react-content-header
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Sprout Social seeds monorepo; no provenance is consistent across all their package releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.11 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.10 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.9 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.8 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.7 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.6 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.5 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.4 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.3 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.2 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 11 |
v0.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.