@squiz/db-lib
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Migration file loader pattern — requires scripts from a known migration directory, not user-controlled input. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal org library; missing README/repo/keywords is typical for private org packages published to npm. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.77.3 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.77.2 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.77.1 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.77.0 | 9 / 7 |
v1.77.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.77.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.77.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.77.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.