@stack-spot/auth
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established scoped package (@stack-spot/auth) with 58 versions; missing metadata is a style issue, not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1.3 | 3 / 10 | |
| 7.1.2 | 3 / 10 | |
| 7.1.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 7.1.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 7.0.0 | 3 / 10 |
v7.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.