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@stacksjs/bumpx

Automatically bump your versions.

51
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

chrisbreuerglenn123

Keywords

versionbumpsemverreleasegitnpmpackagecli

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Established package with clean history; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:bunfig AI (phantom-deps): bunfig is a config-loading utility; referenced in config files is expected, not a real phantom-dep concern. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@stacksjs/clapp AI (phantom-deps): Same-org CLI helper; indirect usage pattern is stable for this package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@stacksjs/logsmith AI (phantom-deps): Same-org logging helper; indirect usage pattern is stable for this package. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 78)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
0.2.14 3 / 0
0.2.12 3 / 0
0.2.11 3 / 0
0.2.10 3 / 0
0.2.9 3 / 0
0.2.8 3 / 0
0.2.7 3 / 0
0.2.6 3 / 0
0.2.5 3 / 0
0.2.4 3 / 0
0.2.3 3 / 0
0.2.2 3 / 1
0.2.1 3 / 1
0.2.0 3 / 1
0.1.86 3 / 1
0.1.85 3 / 1
0.1.84 3 / 1
0.1.83 3 / 1
0.1.82 3 / 1
0.1.81 3 / 1
0.1.80 3 / 1
0.1.79 3 / 1
0.1.78 3 / 1
0.1.77 3 / 1
0.1.76 3 / 1
0.1.75 3 / 1
0.1.74 3 / 1
0.1.71 3 / 1
0.1.70 3 / 1
0.1.69 3 / 1
0.1.68 3 / 1
0.1.65 3 / 1
0.1.61 3 / 1
0.1.60 3 / 1
0.1.59 3 / 1
0.1.58 3 / 1
0.1.57 3 / 1
0.1.56 3 / 1
0.1.55 3 / 1
0.1.54 3 / 1
0.1.53 3 / 1
0.1.52 3 / 1
0.1.46 3 / 1
0.1.45 3 / 1
0.1.38 3 / 1
0.1.37 3 / 1
0.1.36 3 / 1
0.1.35 3 / 1
0.1.34 3 / 1
0.1.33 2 / 1
0.1.32 2 / 1

v0.2.14

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.12

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.2.8

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chrisbreuer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-22, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.2.7

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chrisbreuer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-22, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.