@stacksjs/clarity
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bunfig | AI (phantom-deps): bunfig is a known stacksjs config-loading lib, likely used via dynamic/config resolution not static import. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is from bundled dist/bin/cli.js and dist/src/index.js build output, not injected payload. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.31 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.3.30 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.3.29 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.3.11 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.10 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.9 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.8 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.7 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.6 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.5 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.4 | 1 / 12 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 17 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 17 |
v0.3.31
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-21, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.30
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.