@stacksjs/desktop
Native desktop application framework for stx (powered by Craft)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stacksjs/build | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling package, not third-party. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stacksjs/server | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling package, not third-party. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:unified-network | AI (dependencies): Established dep used across stacksjs packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:unstorage | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config, not direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:unified-network | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced networking dep, not directly imported by design. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/server | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scope, config-referenced server package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tauri-apps/api | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced tauri tooling, expected for desktop app. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:vue | AI (phantom-deps): Used via config/build tooling, not direct import; stable pattern for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/build | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scope, config-referenced build tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tauri-apps/cli | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced tauri CLI, expected for desktop app. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): No material changes in this version; established package with trusted publisher history makes dormant-publish a low-risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with long history; lack of Sigstore provenance is a process gap, not a security indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 212)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.70.139 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.111 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.98 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.93 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.85 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.78 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.77 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.76 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.75 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.74 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.73 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.72 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.71 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.70 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.69 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.68 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.67 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.66 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.65 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.64 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.63 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.62 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.61 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.60 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.59 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.58 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.57 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.56 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.55 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.54 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.53 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.70.16 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.15 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.14 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.13 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.12 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.11 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.10 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.9 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.8 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.7 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.6 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.5 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.4 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.3 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.2 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.1 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.70.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.69.3 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.69.2 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.69.1 | 0 / 9 |
v0.70.139
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (chrisbreuer) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-20, but chrisbreuer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.70.111
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
v0.70.98
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
v0.70.93
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (chrisbreuer) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-17, but chrisbreuer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.70.85
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): Provenance regression combined with publisher change is a strong compromise indicator for this package.) This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (chrisbreuer) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-15, but chrisbreuer is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.70.78
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.77
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.76
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.75
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.74
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.73
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.72
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.71
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.70
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.69
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.68
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.67
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.66
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.65
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.64
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.62
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.61
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.60
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.59
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.58
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.57
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.56
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.70.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.69.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.69.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.69.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.