@stacksjs/logsmith
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bunfig | AI (phantom-deps): Used via config, not direct import; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pickier | AI (phantom-deps): New lint tool referenced via config, not direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/clapp | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org CLI framework dep, used indirectly. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.18 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.15 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.14 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 0 |
v0.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-05-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-05-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.