@stacksjs/stx
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled UI framework library; network+exec from bundled dependencies, not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cli.js | AI (source-diff): CLI tool with bundled deps; network+exec pattern is normal for a build/dev tool. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bun-bundled output for library entry point; readable domain logic visible in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/cli.js | AI (source-diff): Bun-bundled output for CLI entry point; readable domain logic visible in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-2ndtnc0t.js | AI (source-diff): new Function() in template evaluator is standard for UI frameworks; not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/headwind | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; used via config/plugin wiring rather than direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/desktop | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; used via config/plugin wiring rather than direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/markdown | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; used via config/plugin wiring rather than direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bunfig | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files; Bun config utility, not a direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/clapp | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ts-syntax-highlighter | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference in build tool; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/sanitizer | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/ts-craft | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bun-plugin-stx | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference in build tool; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cwcss/crosswind | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference in build tool; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 54)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.53 | 11 / 0 | |
| 0.2.50 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.48 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.47 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.46 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.45 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.44 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.43 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.42 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.41 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.40 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.39 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.38 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.37 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.36 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.35 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.33 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.32 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.31 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.30 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.29 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.28 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.26 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.24 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.21 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.20 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.19 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.18 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.17 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.16 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.15 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.13 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.12 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.11 | 10 / 0 | |
| 0.2.10 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.2.9 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 9 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 7 / 0 |
v0.2.53
32 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.16
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.12
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.10
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.