@standardserver/shared

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-24, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-24, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-24, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-21, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-20, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-17, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-06-09, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-05-29, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-05-14, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-05-06, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-05-04, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-04-02, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

All previous maintainers (unnoq) were replaced by new maintainers (dinwwwh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

This version was published by a different npm account (dinwwwh) than the most recent previously approved version (unnoq) on 2026-03-21, but dinwwwh is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.