@stdlib/fs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped stdlib package; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive with no brand impersonation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped stdlib package; Levenshtein match to 'pg' is a false positive with no brand impersonation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stdlib/cli | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo-style stdlib packages. | ai |
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (kgryte) than the most recent previously approved version (stdlib-bot) on 2026-06-05, but kgryte is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.3
2 findingsPackage name '@stdlib/fs' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'qs'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.