@stdlib/utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Standard global-detection idiom `new Function('return this;')` — not arbitrary code execution. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Loads a manifest config file from a resolved path; not user-controlled arbitrary module loading. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Used in open-url to spawn OS browser opener; documented and expected behavior for this utility. | ai |
v0.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (kgryte) than the most recent previously approved version (stdlib-bot) on 2026-06-05, but kgryte is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.