@storybook/react-native-ui-lite
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate CI/CD migration for storybookjs org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @legendapp/list and @nozbe/microfuzz are established React Native libs; swap-in for fuse.js is a routine dependency update. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; missing gitHead is superseded by stronger supply-chain integrity signal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Storybook org publisher; lack of provenance is consistent across all their packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@storybook/react-native-theming | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same official Storybook React Native monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@storybook/react-native-ui-common | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same official Storybook React Native monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.4.4 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.4.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.4.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.4.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 10.4.0 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.3.2 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.3.1 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.3.0 | 8 / 5 | |
| 10.2.3 | 8 / 4 | |
| 10.2.2 | 8 / 4 | |
| 10.2.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 10.2.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 10.1.11 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.1.3 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.1.2 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.1.1 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.1.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.7 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.6 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.5 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.4 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.3 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.2 | 7 / 8 | |
| 10.0.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 10.0.0 | 8 / 8 |
v10.4.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.