@storyteller-platform/path
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal platform package under @storyteller-platform scope; sparse metadata is expected for team-internal utilities, not indicative of spam or malice. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal scoped package; missing description is a documentation gap, not a security signal for this namespace. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published via GitLab CI/CD; Sigstore provenance is not yet standard for GitLab-based pipelines. No security concern given clean package content. | ai |
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.