@strapi/client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.2 | 2 / 29 | |
| 1.6.1 | 2 / 24 | |
| 1.6.0 | 2 / 24 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 25 |
v1.6.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jhoward1994) than the most recent previously approved version (nico-strapi) on 2026-06-04, but jhoward1994 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.