@stream-io/video-filters-web
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): MediaPipe/tflite wasm binaries are documented ML runtime dependencies for this video-filter package. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase from bundled MediaPipe model/wasm files matching new dependency, not injected code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-compiled MediaPipe WASM loader; minification is expected and matches upstream MediaPipe build artifacts. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_nosimd_internal.js | AI (source-diff): Same Emscripten/MediaPipe WASM loader pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migration from stream-release-bot to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate CI pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.3 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.8.2 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.8.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.8.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.7.5 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.7.4 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.7.3 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.7.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.7.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 6 |
v0.8.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stream-release-bot) on 2026-03-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.2
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stream-release-bot) on 2026-01-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.1
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stream-release-bot) on 2026-01-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stream-release-bot) on 2025-12-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.6.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • mediapipe/wasm/vision_wasm_internal.wasm • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • tf/tflite/tflite-simd.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.