@stripe/extensibility-custom-objects-tools
Build-time transformer for Stripe custom objects.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Stripe org internal account rename; new maintainers follow stripe-suffix naming convention. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removed accounts replaced by stripe-suffixed equivalents; consistent with internal Stripe account migration. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@formspec/build | AI (dependencies): Internal Stripe build dependency in a Stripe-org package; expected unvetted status for new ecosystem tooling. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stripe/extensibility-tool-utils | AI (dependencies): Internal Stripe utility package; expected unvetted status for new Stripe extensibility SDK tooling. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Stripe monorepo CI publish; provenance absence is consistent across their npm releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.42.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.41.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.41.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.40.0 | 5 / 5 |
v0.42.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.