@stryke/prisma-trpc-generator
A fork of the prisma-trpc-generator code to work in ESM with Prisma v6.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from stormie-bot to GitHub Actions CI is a documented CI/CD migration; SLSA provenance attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/zod/transformer.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified Zod transformer; readable class structure, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/packages/string-format/src/acronyms.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of the acronym dictionary; same benign content as the .cjs counterpart. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/packages/string-format/src/acronyms.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified build artifact (acronym dictionary); content is plainly readable and benign. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/zod/model-helpers.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified Zod model-helper logic; no obfuscation, just bundler output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/prisma-generator.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified Prisma generator entry; content matches documented generator behavior. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:parenthesis | AI (phantom-deps): Dependency is bundled into dist/index.mjs; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stryke/path | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep bundled into dist; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stryke/fs | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep bundled into dist; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard ESM bundle output; imports are readable, no obfuscation/eval patterns present. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop reflects bundling format change (separate files → single .mjs bundle), not code removal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:jiti | AI (phantom-deps): Dependency is bundled into dist/index.mjs; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:prettier | AI (phantom-deps): Dependency is bundled into dist/index.mjs; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ts-morph | AI (phantom-deps): Dependency is bundled into dist/index.mjs; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:esbuild | AI (phantom-deps): esbuild is a known runtime/binary implicit dep for bundlers; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@prisma/generator-helper | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files as expected for a Prisma generator; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@prisma/internals | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files as expected for a Prisma generator; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 121)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.13.101 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.100 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.99 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.98 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.97 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.96 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.95 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.94 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.93 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.92 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.91 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.90 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.89 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.88 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.87 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.86 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.85 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.84 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.83 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.82 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.81 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.80 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.79 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.78 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.77 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.76 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.75 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.74 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.73 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.72 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.71 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.70 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.67 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.66 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.65 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.64 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.63 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.62 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.61 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.60 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.59 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.57 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.56 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.55 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.54 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.53 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.52 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.51 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.50 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.49 | 10 / 3 | |
| 0.13.48 | 10 / 3 |
v0.13.101
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.100
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.99
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.98
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.97
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.96
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.95
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (stormie-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-27, but stormie-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.13.94
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (stormie-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-25, but stormie-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.13.93
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.92
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.91
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.90
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.89
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.88
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.87
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.86
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.85
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.84
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.83
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.82
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.81
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.80
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.79
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.78
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.77
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.76
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.75
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.74
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.73
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.72
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.71
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.70
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.67
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.66
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.65
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.64
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.62
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.61
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.60
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.59
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.57
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.56
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.49
6 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.48
6 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.