@stryke/unique-id
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from stormie-bot to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation — this is a legitimate and security-improving transition for the storm-software/stryke project. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minor cosmetic signals (off-topic README, no keywords) on an established 443-day-old package with 86 versions and 4 approved dependents. Not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 90)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.96 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.95 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.94 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.93 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.92 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.91 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.90 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.89 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.88 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.87 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.3.86 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.3.85 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.3.84 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.3.83 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.82 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.81 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.80 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.79 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.78 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.77 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.76 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.75 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.74 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.73 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.72 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.71 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.70 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.69 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.68 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.67 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.66 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.65 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.64 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.61 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.60 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.59 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.58 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.57 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.56 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.55 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.54 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.53 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.51 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.50 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.49 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.48 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.47 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.46 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.45 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.44 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.43 | 0 / 1 |
v0.3.96
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.95
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.94
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.93
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.92
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.91
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.90
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.89
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.88
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (stormie-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-25, but stormie-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.87
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.86
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.85
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.84
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.83
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.82
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.80
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.79
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.78
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.77
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.76
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.69
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.68
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.