@stylexjs/shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.18.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.17.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.17.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.17.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.17.0 | 0 / 2 |
v0.19.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (mellyeliu) than the most recent previously approved version (naman34) on 2026-06-16, but mellyeliu is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.18.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.17.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.