@substrate/discovery
<br /><br />
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): paritytech-ci is Parity Technologies' CI account (1686 approved packages, 0 rejected); transition from paritytech to paritytech-ci is an expected org-level CI automation change for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of jeluard aligns with Parity Technologies consolidating publishing under their CI account; no hostile takeover indicators given publisher track record and unchanged package content. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-09-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.