@substrate/light-client-extension-helpers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): paritytech-ci is Parity's CI publishing account with 1791 approved packages; transition from paritytech to paritytech-ci reflects legitimate CI/CD automation adoption. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual maintainer (jeluard) consistent with org-level CI publishing transition; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): All 7 new deps are @polkadot-api/* packages from the official Parity Technologies Polkadot API library; consistent with migration to polkadot-api monorepo. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by new chain spec JSON files and new modules; consistent with legitimate feature expansion. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Package gained substantial new functionality (tx-helper, known-chain-specs for 5 chains, smoldot integration) explaining 236 new files. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/json-rpc-provider | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/metadata-builders | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/observable-client | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/substrate-bindings | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/utils | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/json-rpc-provider-proxy | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): paritytech-ci is a well-established publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a meaningful risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/metadata-compatibility | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/signer | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/codegen | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/polkadot-signer | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polkadot-api/substrate-client | AI (dependencies): @polkadot-api/* packages are first-party Parity Technologies dependencies from the same monorepo; expected and legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@substrate/connect-extension-protocol | AI (phantom-deps): Dependency is properly declared in package.json; phantom classification is a false positive for same-org scoped utilities. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.7.6 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.5 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.4 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.3 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.2 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.1 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.7.0 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.6.1 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.6.0 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.5.2 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.5.1 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.5.0 | 14 / 6 | |
| 2.4.1 | 12 / 5 | |
| 2.4.0 | 12 / 4 | |
| 2.3.0 | 12 / 3 | |
| 2.2.2 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.2.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.2.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.1.3 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.1.2 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.1.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 2.0.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 1 |
v2.7.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.