@superfluid-finance/ethereum-contracts
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@safe-global/protocol-kit | AI (phantom-deps): Package already uses multiple @safe-global/* deps; usage in build/ops scripts not detected by import scanner is expected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@safe-global/api-kit | AI (phantom-deps): Safe multisig tooling dep used in ops scripts, not imported as JS module; stable FP for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@truffle/contract | AI (phantom-deps): Truffle contract dep used via Truffle plugin system, not direct ES imports. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@nomiclabs/hardhat-ethers | AI (phantom-deps): Hardhat plugin loaded via hardhat config, not direct imports — standard Hardhat pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ethereumjs-tx | AI (phantom-deps): Ethereum tooling dep used transitively via Truffle/Hardhat plugin system, not direct imports. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@openzeppelin/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in Solidity/config files; not a JS import — standard for Solidity contract packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@decentral.ee/web3-helpers | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org helper dep; used via runtime tooling, not direct imports. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ethereumjs-util | AI (phantom-deps): Ethereum tooling dep used transitively via Truffle/Hardhat plugin system, not direct imports. | ai |
v1.15.1
2 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.0
7 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.0
6 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.