@swc-react/icon
React and Next.js wrapper of the @spectrum-web-components/icon component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Adobe migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Adobe-published SWC wrapper; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions of this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.12.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.12.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.12.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.11.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.11.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.11.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.10.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.9.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.9.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v1.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rajrock38) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2025-04-15, but rajrock38 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rajrock38) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2025-01-29, but rajrock38 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (rajrock38) than the most recent previously approved version (rubenc) on 2024-11-11, but rajrock38 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.