@syncfusion/ej2-angular-notifications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
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Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.49 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 |
v33.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.