@syncfusion/ej2-angular-ribbon
Essential JS 2 Component for Angular
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Syncfusion org-wide account migration from essentialjs2 to syncfusion-javascript; new publisher has strong approval track record. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by org-level npm account transition; consistent across all Syncfusion ej2-angular packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Syncfusion packages consistently have link-heavy READMEs; not a spam/phishing indicator for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-base | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org transitive dep; declared but used indirectly via ej2-ribbon/ej2-angular-base — stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.49 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 3 / 0 |
v33.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.