@syncfusion/ej2-excel-export
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Syncfusion does not publish with Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-base | AI (dependencies): First-party Syncfusion sibling dependency; stable pattern across all ej2 packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-compression | AI (dependencies): First-party Syncfusion sibling dependency; stable pattern across all ej2 packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 2 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 2 / 0 |
v33.1.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.