@syncfusion/ej2-progressbar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-data | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Syncfusion dep; declared for transitive consumers, not directly imported in this component. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 3 / 0 |
v33.1.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.